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Abstract 
Social contacts influence decisions and economic outputs in a variety of contexts.  Does social 
network matter also in financial markets? In this paper I investigate the effect of social networks on 
mutual funds performance by exploiting data on the education of U.S. fund managers. The results 
show that performance is better for fund managers with many social connections. Furthermore, 
positional advantages in the social network generate superior performance. This evidence suggests that 
social interaction and information spillovers have a positive and meaningful value for mutual funds. 
Keywords 
Social Network, Mutual Fund, Performance. 
JEL Classification: G23, L14 
1. Introduction∗
In many contexts, beliefs, attitudes, and decisions are signiﬁcantly af-
fected by social interactions. Previous evidence indicates that social net-
works are important channels of information transmission about jobs, expe-
rience goods, new technologies and opinions. Whether there are information
spillovers in competitive environments too, such as ﬁnancial markets, is still
an open question. The objective of this paper is to examine the role of social
networks on fund managers performance.
While a substantial body of literature investigates returns in ﬁnancial mar-
kets and the mutual fund industry, few papers deal with the underlying
patterns of information acquisition actually used by professional investors.
Shiller and Pound (1989) document that fund managers use computers, re-
ports by analysts, macro-forecasts, personal investigation and newspapers.
In addition, managers formulate investment choices by speaking with other
people. Similarly, Drachter et al. (2007) conduct a telephone survey among
German mutual fund managers and their results conﬁrm the existence of an
informal exchange of information with other people, in particular other fund
managers. According to this evidence, fund managers seem to actively ex-
change information with colleagues and not just passively herd other funds.
This contrasts with the view that investors act as proﬁt maximizers in a per-
fectly eﬃcient and competitive1 market, and therefore, should not share their
own private information. Yet, Kahneman and Tversky (see, e.g., Kahneman
and Tversky 1979) show that people facing uncertainty do not act necessarily
in a fully rational way. Financial markets are an ideal setting in which to
test individual decision making and a number of studies are available on in-
dividual investors (Barber and Odean, 2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000).
Whether professional investors, in a similar fashion to individual investors,
∗This research was conducted while the author was a Jean Monnet Fellow at the
RSCAS of the EUI.
I would like to thank Ulrike Malmendier for helpful discussions during the early stages of
this project. I also thank Klaus Schaeck and seminar participants at UC Berkeley and
Padova University.
1Several business publications and information services rank and evaluate in relative
terms mutual funds with similar investment objectives. Similarly, an extensive empirical
literature models the mutual fund market as a tournament in which funds compete with
one another (Brown et al., 1996).
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do not behave as standard “rational” investment models would predict is
somewhat less obvious. On the one hand, professional investors have speciﬁc
training, trading is their professional activity and they have access to a large
number of information sources. On the other hand, investors experience a
high level of uncertainty, markets follow unpredictable patterns and, over the
last decade, have signiﬁcantly increased in complexity. Moreover, while at-
tention is a scarce cognitive resource for all people (Kahneman, 1973), social
interaction is likely to be a salient source of information.
Thus, direct and indirect information acquired through social interactions
may have a role in investors’ decision making. If this is the case, ultimate
choice, stock selections and timings of trades are, to some extent, inﬂuenced
by colleagues and friends, and, as a result, interpersonal connections af-
fect fund performance. Viewing the ﬁnancial market as a network of agents
characterized by information spillovers implies that the relative positions of
mutual funds managers in the intricate web of linkages may inﬂuence their
fund performances.
In this study, a network is constructed using detailed information on man-
agers’ educational backgrounds. More precisely, I consider two fund man-
agers to be socially connected if they graduated from the same university
with the same type of degree.2 This previously built network structure, is
exogenous and can be quite a good proxy for the eﬀective network that a man-
ager maintains. In other words, a better “education network” established
during undergraduate and graduate studies can favor valuable endogenous
social connections in the future.
In order to relate fund performance to managers’ networks, I use tools pro-
vided by social network analysis. First, I investigate the topology of the
network. As a result, I ﬁnd that fund managers’ networks have all the char-
acteristics of a small-world. Second, relating fund performances to network
characteristics, I ﬁnd that larger funds hire well connected managers. This
results indicates that social network is used in the labor market for fund man-
agers. Third, I compute measures of network centrality and ﬁnd that funds
managed by better socially connected managers have a better performance.
2I am not the ﬁrst to use information on education as a proxy for social networks:
other papers derive social connections between fund managers and executives (Cohen
et al., 2008), analysts and company board members (Cohen et al., 2010), and executives
and bank oﬃcers (Engelberg et al., 2012).
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This ﬁnding suggests that fund managers beneﬁt from being in a better po-
sition in the network. In accordance with the ﬁndings of Shiller and Pound
(1989) and Drachter et al. (2007), I interpret this result as a consequence
of using the informal social network in the decision-making process. Even
though this evidence might be reconciled in a fully rational paradigm, assum-
ing, for example, that investors hold complementary pieces of information3
or have reciprocal preferences towards a few colleagues, it indicates that pro-
fessional investors do not act in isolation and beneﬁt from exchanging ideas
with others. With the development of online communication tools, which
provide enormous possibilities for staying in constant touch with friends, it
is most likely that the eﬀect of social interaction in investment decisions is
much more important than I am able to document. Indeed, anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that professional managers use online investors communities
to discuss strategies, ideas, and stock picks.4
The present paper relates to diﬀerent strands of literature. First, a number
of papers test for behavioral models in the trading activity of professional
investors. Their empirical ﬁndings show that they exhibit herding (Grin-
blatt et al., 1995), home bias (Shiller et al., 1996), excessive turnover (Dow
and Gorton, 1997), loss aversion (Coval and Shumway, 2005; Haigh and List,
2005), disposition eﬀect (Venezia and Shapira, 2007; Cici, 2012), and undere-
action to news (Frazzini, 2006). My paper contributes by underling the social
dimension of the decision-making process among mutual fund managers.
Second, a growing literature examines social networks in ﬁnancial settings.
My work is close in the spirit of Hochberg et al. (2007), who analyze the
networks of venture capitalists (VCs) and ﬁnd that better networked VCs
exhibit better performances. Similarly, in Fracassi (2012) corporate ﬁnance
policies are related to the social networks of board of directors. In order
to quantify the relative importance of each actor in a network, both papers
use measures of network centrality. Following a similar approach, I study
3Stein (2008) considers a model in which competitors exchange information with one
another; he shows that a truth-telling equilibrium is sustainable with complementarity of
information.
4For example, many traders, individual investors, investment advisors, and money
managers have Twitter accounts and use them to talk about stocks. The phenomenon is
so widespread that more recently, a service company computes a daily sentiment indicator
for a number of stocks based on tweets mentioning individual stocks.
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the relationship between mutual fund performance and managers’ networks.
Moreover, I also address issues of network topology, as in Davis and Greve
(1997), who, in contrast to my study, use data on members of corporate
boards.
Third, mutual fund performance has been the object of investigation of nu-
merous works, and some papers emphasize the role of manager characteris-
tics. The pioneering study by Golec (1996), using a limited sample of funds,
shows that funds managed by younger managers, with an MBA and long
tenure achieve better performance. In contrast, Chevalier and Ellison (1999)
ﬁnd that none of these characteristics are particularly important but that
what really matters is the mean composite SAT score.5 In Gottesman and
Morey (2006) the quality of the MBA is a good predictor of fund performance.
Other works investigate diﬀerence in performance based on fund managers’
gender (Atkinson et al., 2003; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2007), the number of
managers (e.g. Prather and Middleton, 2002; Chen et al., 2004; Ba¨r et al.,
2008),6 and team diversity (Ba¨r and Niessen, 2007). One novelty of my paper
is that I focus on managers’ social networks, which, by providing access to
valuable information, inﬂuence fund performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates
the data and provides network deﬁnitions. Section 3 characterizes the fund
managers’ networks. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and Section
5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and social network deﬁnitions
2.1. Data
To perform my investigation, I combine diﬀerent data sources. First,
data on managers’ education comes from the Mornigstar Principia CD-Rom.
5SAT Reasoning Test (Scholastic Aptitude Test and Scholastic Assessment Test) tests
reading, writing and math; usually colleges and universities use the SAT score to make
their admission decisions.
6These works, yielding ambiguous predictions, investigate the diﬀerence in perfor-
mance between single and team-managed funds. The number of funds managed by teams
of managers, either named or anonymously, has grown much in the last decade. This
phenomenon has been documented by Massa and Reuter (2006). In these mutual funds,
either the portfolio decisions are taken by a committee or each manager decides for a part
of the portfolio.
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However, it is not exhaustive so I enlarge my sample by collecting data from
several web sites (sec.info, fund websites, zoom.info). The information about
managers’ education comprises academic institution, type of degree and year
of graduation. In addition, I use information from College Board to compute
the average SAT at university level. College Board7 provides the scores of
the 25th and 75th percentiles and I compute the average of these values.
Second, the data source for fund information is the Survivorship-Bias-Free
US Mutual Fund Database provided by the Center for Research in Security
Prices (hereafter CRSP). CRSP reports various data about funds; I collect
information about return, assets, expenses, fund age, and turnover. The unit
of observation in CRSP is each share class of a fund, but I need a unique
observation for each fund. Indeed, each manager in a fund is responsible
for all share classes within a single portfolio of holdings. Hence, to avoid
double counting, as in Grinblatt et al. (1995), I add up these data into one
observation per fund.8
I merge the Mornigstar data and CRSP data; for all the funds that do not
have a match I merge them manually by looking at the name (otherwise,
these funds are deleted). My analysis is limited to funds managed by a
unique manager, in such a way that there is just one decision-maker per
fund. I further restrict the sample by considering only those funds with
an active investment style: Growth, Aggressive Growth, Growth &Income,
Income.9 The period of observation spans from 1996 to 2007.
2.2. Social network deﬁnitions
This section introduces network notations and statistics that are helpful
in illustrating the structure and deﬁnes centrality measures. A network is a
set of nodes N = {1, ..., n}. Nodes are interconnected through links, which
are deﬁned with gi,j representing the relationship between node i and node j.
The total number of links is D =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N gi,j. In my setting, nodes are
mutual fund managers, and links, based on academic aﬃliation, represent
7College Board does not report scores for all colleges and universities in my sample. In
these cases as in Christoﬀersen and Sarkissian (2009), I exploit the ACT scores (American
College Testing).
8For variables such as expense ratios or returns values are weighted by the total net
assets of each share class.
9I select all the funds that are classiﬁed in one of these categories as deﬁned by the
Investment Company Data Inc. (ICDI).
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social connections. More precisely, managers are connected if they attended
the same institution and they gained the same degree. Here, each link is
undirected, exactly like in friendship or other bilateral relationship, because
g is symmetric in such a way that gij = gji.
To describe the overall network I need to introduce a number of statistical
deﬁnitions. Network density, deﬁned as δ = D/n(n − 1) is the proportion
of the actual number of links out of all possible links. The shortest path
length d(i, j) between two nodes, i and j, is deﬁned as the minimum number
of links that need to be traversed to pass from i to j (or vice versa). Then,
the average path length is simply the average value of the shortest paths
over all distinct pairs of nodes, mathematically L =
∑
d(i,j)
n(n−1) . The clustering
coeﬃcient Ci for a node i is given by the proportion of links between the
nodes within its neighborhood divided by the maximum possible number.
Then, the clustering coeﬃcient for the entire graph is the average over all
nodes.
To identify the importance of managers in the overall network I have to pro-
vide some deﬁnitions at node level. Degree is the number of links from node
i, formally ki(g) =
∑
i∈N
gi,j. A higher number of links means a central position
in the network and a greater number of social contacts. In my setting, man-
agers with a higher number of links have greater opportunities to exchange
information, and better opportunities to have access to valuable information.
Closeness is a measure of inﬂuence. Unlike the degree of centrality, closeness
takes into account both direct and indirect links: cC(i) =
1∑
y∈U d(i,j)
where
d(i, j) is the shortest path between i and j. The most central unit can reach
all the others quickly. In “communication networks”, the possibility of ei-
ther reaching other investors or being reachable by others over shorter path
lengths is a source of power.
Degree and closeness capture, in diﬀerent ways, how well connected a mutual
fund manager is. I interpret the social network of fund managers as a conduit
of information exchange. Thus, social connections serve either to communi-
cate valuable information or to search for information. Consequently, bet-
ter connected managers, to some extent, should exhibit better performance.
However, rumors too might spread through social connections,10 and thus
10If this is the case, social networks may have no impact, or even a negative eﬀect, on
fund performance.
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the relationship between fund performance and managers’ social networks is
not a priori obvious.
3. Descriptive analysis
3.1. Fund and manager characteristics
After these restrictions, and considering only funds managed by managers
for whom valid education information is available, my sample consists of 4989
fund-year observations. Summary statistics are given in table 1; the second
column shows characteristics for all the funds and managers. On average,
the turnover ratio is 88.24% and the expense ratio is 1.25%. The average
fund age, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the current year and the year of
organization of the fund, is 13 years.
In addition to SAT, by using the education information about fund managers
I construct two additional variables: MBA (a dummy variable that takes
value one if the manager holds an MBA, and zero otherwise) and PHD (a
dummy variable that takes value one if the manager holds a PhD, and zero
otherwise). The average SAT is approximately 1252 and 650 managers hold
an MBA degree while only 42 managers hold a PhD. The year of graduation
allows me to infer the age of managers. As in Chevalier and Ellison (1999),
I assume that manager was 21 years old upon college graduation. This
information is not available for all managers so I create a dummy variable
equal to one for managers with missing age (MISSINGAGE). Managers’
tenure is computed as the diﬀerence between the current year and the ﬁrst
year that the manager took control of the fund. The average manager’s age
is 46, while their tenure at a fund averages about 5 years. According to my
deﬁnition of the network, a number of managers do not have any connections.
I generate a dummy variable called NET, which equals 1 if the manager in
charge has at least one connection in that year, and 0 otherwise. In my
sample, there are 956 fund-year observations without connections. The third
and the fourth column shows fund and manager characteristics in the two
sub-samples. Funds with networked managers are signiﬁcantly older, have
larger amounts of assets, but lower expenses compared to non-connected
funds. Managers that do not belong to a network generally attended less
“popular” (at least in the ﬁnance industry) universities and they do not hold
7
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an MBA.11 Connected managers have higher tenure and SAT score.
3.2. Network structure and measures
In this section I focus on a description of managers’ networks.
First, given my above deﬁnitions, managers are mapped onto a network year
by year. As a result, I have on average 301 vertices and 3,031 links. Network
information is used to draw a graph, which seems to be neither a random
graph nor completely ordered and, in comparison with the total number of
nodes, the number of links per node is small (see ﬁgure 1). While there
are only a few nodes with a high number of connections, many managers
are mutually reachable through paths, which establish a big component, in
which there is a path from each vertex to any other manager, represented by
the academic institutions where many fund managers graduated (75% of the
managers).
The network statistics are shown in table 2 (part A). The network has a
sparse topology, with a density score equal to 0.033, meaning that approxi-
mately only 3 mangers know each other, but the average path length, L, is
equal to 3.88 which indicates that, on average, in less than 4 steps the whole
network can be traversed, this is quite a short chain connecting pairs of peo-
ple. Moreover, the manager network is highly clustered, with the coeﬃcient
C equal to 0.82. Given these characteristics of the networks I deepen my
study of their topology by verifying for the existence of small world network
(henceforth SWN) properties.12 In all years, the results conﬁrm that the
manager networks are like a SWN, which is an interesting result given the
diﬀusion properties of such a network structure.
Second, the key variables for my investigation are the centrality measures
used as proxies for managers’ positions in the network. Table 2 (part B)
reports the descriptive statistics of the centrality measures.
Correlations with fund and manager characteristics are generally quite low,
except for degree/closeness with MBA and SAT. This means that managers
with a high number of connections hold an MBA and this follows from the
11Given my deﬁnition of links, managers with an MBA have a higher probability of
being connected with someone else.
12The SWN properties require that L is almost as small as Lrandom and C >> Crandom
where Lrandom and Crandom are respectively the average path length and the clustering
coeﬃcient of a random graph of the same size and with the same number of vertices as
the manager network.
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network deﬁnition. The high correlation with SAT means that funds select
many managers from good universities and as a consequence they are highly
networked. Correlations between degree and closeness are high because, by
construction, a manager with a high number of direct links will have a high
number of indirect links (the correlation with closeness is 0.69). I run regres-
sions for the two centrality measures separately, as in Hochberg et al. (2007),
so multicollinearity is not a problem.
4. Methodology
4.1. Measures of performance
In this section, I describe the empirical strategy to test the impact of
social connections on fund performance. The ﬁrst step of the procedure is to
compute the fund return. Diﬀerent measures of return are used. I consider
the gross return (deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the raw return and the
risk free) and the abnormal return (the diﬀerence between the gross return
of the fund and the mean return across all funds in the same market segment
for a given year). These measures do not take into account the riskiness of
a fund’s strategy, and therefore I consider other measures of performance
already adopted in previous studies.
I calculate the fund’s Jensen Alpha, the 3-factor model, the 4-factor model,
the Treynor Mazuy model and a model with public information.
The market model or CAPM Jensen (1969) is represented as follows
ri,t = αi,t + βi,trM,t + ei,t (1)
where rM,t = (RM,t − τt). ri,t is the return on the aggregate mutual fund
portfolio i at time t minus the riskfree rate of interest (the one-month U.S.
T-bill rate for time t, τt), and RM,m,t is the return of the U.S. market portfolio.
αi,t is the fund alpha for each fund i. This measure of performance is preferred
to raw returns because it is risk-adjusted. That is, Jensen’s alpha will not
be high when a low skilled manager takes a highly risky position (assets with
high betas), in the contrary case the raw return could appear highly positive.
The second measure is computed by using the well-known Fama and French
model (1993) and it has been appraised as a better representation of fund
9
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performance. Formally,
ri,t = αi,t + βi,trM,t + γi,tSMBt + δi,tHMLt + ei,t (2)
where SMBt and HMLt are respectively the size and the book-to-market of
the three-factor model. I obtain the monthly time-series of the three Fama-
French factors and the momentum factor from Professor Kenneth French’s
data library.13
The third model is the four-factor model used by Carhart (1997) deﬁned as
ri,t = αi,t + βi,trM,t + γi,tSMBt + δi,tHMLt + ηi,tUMDt + ei,t (3)
This model is similar to the Fama and French model but adds a further
term UMDt, which represents the momentum factor in order to capture the
momentum anomaly (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) emphasize that α can include the market timing
ability of fund managers. So they rewrite eq. 1 as
ri,t = αi,t + βi,trM,m,t + γi,tr
2
M,t + ei,t (4)
In this equation γi,t represents market timing ability.
Indeed, Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Christopherson et al. (1998) point
out the importance of separating managers’ ability and private versus public
information. Thus, I consider the following conditional alpha model:
ri,t = αi,t + βi,trM,t + ϕi,t(ZTbill,t−1rM,t) + ϕj,t(ZTerm,t−1rM,t) + ei,t (5)
ZTbill,t−1 is the one month U.S. Treasury bill rate and ZTerm,t−1 is a proxy
for public information (term-structure spread) and it is calculated as the
diﬀerence between the rates of the 10-year U.S. government bond and the
three-month U.S. T-bill.
In all these methods, αi,t can be interpreted as a measure of over or under
performance: when it is positive it denotes a manager whose investment
choices add value to the fund, while a negative αi,t denotes a manager who
13http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
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reduces the value of the fund. As in previous articles, I use one year of data.
Namely, to compute α in 1996 I use return information starting from January
1995. A fund is deleted if there are no return data for 12-months.14
4.2. Empirical model
The above measures of performance allow me to estimate the importance
of social networks. As a second step of the procedure I use the following
speciﬁcation:
αi,T = ai,T + ϑi,TXFund,T + θi,TXManager,T + ζi,TNetworkT + ei,T (6)
XFund,T and XManager,T are the set of control variables for fund and manager
characteristics respectively. Control variables for fund characteristics are:
size (the log of the total net assets in millions of dollars), expenses (annual
total expense ratios in%), turnover (yearly turnover ratio in %) and fund
age (diﬀerence in years between the current year and the year organization
of the fund). Previous literature ﬁnds that these characteristics impact on
fund performance (Chen et al., 2004, e.g.). In addition, following Chevalier
and Ellison (1999) and Gottesman and Morey (2006), I add some controls for
managers: tenure, MBA, PHD, SAT, AGE and MISSINGAGE. The coeﬃ-
cient of interest is ζ and the variables NET, degree, and closeness, deﬁned in
the previous section, are used as proxies for the explanatory variable Network.
All regressions include time and style ﬁxed eﬀects and errors are clustered
by managers.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Fund characteristics and social networks
In this section, I analyze the relationship between fund characteristics
and manager variables, using network measures in particular. Table 3 and
4 show the results for BETA (model 1), turnover, expense and size. I esti-
mate separate regressions for each network variable and, along with manager
characteristics, I control for fund style and time.
Previous results about the relationship between BETA and manger education
are mixed. While Chevalier and Ellison (1999) ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
14The yearly α is a noisy measure of performance but it allows to capture diﬀerences
across funds.
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relationship with MBA and SAT, Gottesman and Morey (2006) ﬁnd that
neither the quantity nor the quality of education are signiﬁcantly related
to fund BETA. Other manager characteristics are important in Chevalier
and Ellison: higher betas are chosen by older managers or managers with
shorter tenure. My results are in line with Gottesman and Morey regarding
education, and the eﬀect of tenure is negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Network and degree are not statistically signiﬁcant while the coeﬃcient of
closeness is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. This ﬁnding might
suggest that more central managers are able to take more risk because they
have better access to information ﬂows. Turnover is negatively related to
both tenure and SAT, as Chevallier and Ellison and Gottesman and Morey
ﬁnd. Also the relationship between expense ratio and manager characteristics
is in line with the ﬁndings of Chevalier and Ellison. In addition, my results
suggest that both turnover and expense ratio are lower for managers with
many connections. Furthermore, the estimated coeﬃcient analyzing fund size
are positive for manager tenure, SAT and MBA, but negative for manager
age. In all three regressions, network variables are positive and signiﬁcant,
suggesting that larger funds hire well-connected managers. This result may
suggest that larger funds are located in the business city centers where the
best universities are located. In addition, the social network may be used to
enter in the mutual fund industry, particularly by larger funds.
Overall, despite considering a longer time period, my ﬁndings concerning
fund characteristics and manager characteristics are substantially in line with
previous studies. The analysis of network variables suggests that more central
managers take slightly more risk, managers with many connections negatively
inﬂuence to a limited extent the turnover ratio and expense, and are hired
by larger funds.
5.2. Fund performance and social networks
I begin by exploring the diﬀerences in fund performance between man-
agers with some connections and managers that are not connected to anyone
else (see table 5 ). For all the years, the funds are sorted according with to
values of NET, and two diﬀerent portfolios are created (one for funds that
have the value NET=1, another for NET=0). For each portfolio I consider
all seven performance measures. The results of the portfolio analysis suggest
that in all cases the returns are negative, but the diﬀerences are statistically
signiﬁcant only for raw return, abnormal return and four-factor alpha (ta-
ble 5, part A). Then, I study diﬀerences in performance at the micro-level,
12
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controlling for fund and manager characteristics. In all the regressions, as
control variables I include a segment-ﬁxed eﬀect to compare funds that have
the same investment style and time-ﬁxed eﬀect. I implement model 6 includ-
ing the dummy variable NET. The estimates of the network variable are not
statistically signiﬁcant (table 5, part B).
The existence of a small world structure underlines the fact that managers
have substantially diﬀerent positions in the network, which might inﬂuence
performance. Thus, I exploit centrality measures: degree and closeness. Ta-
ble 6 shows the regression results. In column 2 the dependent variable is
gross return and a coeﬃcient 0.0344 for the impact of degree indicates that,
for example, a manager with 10 connections outperforms a manager without
connections by 0.3%. I obtain similar results for models estimated with al-
ternative performance measures. These results suggest that managers’ direct
links have some positive impact on fund performance. Thus, it is possible
that, in addition to the number of direct links, the position in the overall
network and indirect links are also important in ﬁnancial outcomes15. Table
7 shows results in which as centrality measure I include closeness. Remember
that closeness measures the inﬂuence in the network and takes into account
also indirect connections. Let me consider as an example the results for fund
performance measured by the Four factor model (column 5). A coeﬃcient of
0.0049 for the impact of closeness indicates that a manager with a value of
closeness of 0.15 outperforms a manager with a closeness of 0 by 0.7%. The
impact estimated with the other models is similar and statistically signiﬁcant.
Results about fund characteristics are similar to previous literature. Fund
size is signiﬁcantly negative related to performance. Regarding manager char-
acteristics, I ﬁnd that managers age is negatively related to fund performance,
while educational variables indicate that educational background has little
inﬂuence on performance (with the exception of MBA, but the sign and sig-
niﬁcance level vary across the panels).16 In my sample, managers with many
connections graduated from highly ranked colleges or Ivy League universi-
15Betweenness is an additional centrality measure proposed in the social network liter-
ature. Unfortunately managers network does not have betweenness power, consequently
results are not statistically signiﬁcant when using such measure as Network variable in the
empirical model.
16As a robustness check I run all regressions omitting SAT and MBA and obtain similar
results to tables 6 and 7.
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ties. To deal with such issue, all models are estimated controlling for SAT.
Furthermore, as a robustness check, I construct a weighted network, where
the links are deﬁned as in Section 2 and, in addition, weighted with SAT
values. Results for weighted-Degree and weighted-Closeness are presented in
tables 8 and 9, respectively. Importantly, the coeﬃcients are similar to the
previous ﬁndings. This suggests that the quality of the network is important
but the positive impact of degree and closeness on performance is not driven
entirely by the prestige of universities. Overall, positional advantages in the
social network generate superior performance and have a value per se.
5.3. Discussion
A growing number of studies ﬁnd that social connections and the networks
they generate may have eﬀects on economic outcomes (Hochberg et al., 2007;
Fracassi, 2012; Engelberg et al., 2012). As the ﬁndings indicate, positive ex-
ternalities are present in social connections also in the mutual fund industry.
Managers exploiting additional information disseminated in the network are
able to obtain better performances. Unfortunately, the data do not allow
investigation into the underlying mechanisms through which networks create
value. One possibility is that managers strategically exchange private news
with colleagues, motivated by the complementarities in their information
sets.17 Diﬀerently, other-regarding behaviour between friends or acquain-
tances18 may work as channel for transmitting investment strategies and
ideas, which are further propagated through indirect social connections. An-
other possible explanation for information sharing is in the uncertainty and
complexity of the markets. It is possible that individuals rely more on oth-
ers when they face risky decisions. In line with this intuition, Kelly and O
Grada (2000) ﬁnd that Irish depositors during the two panics of 1854 and
1857 based their decisions to close their bank accounts on the choices of
their peers’. This is not the only paper on individual investors and social
inﬂuence. A few works ﬁnd that social interactions are important in stock
market participation (Hong et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2008) and investment
decisions (Feng and Seasholes, 2004; Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner, 2007). In the
end, according to my results, despite the higher level of sophistication mu-
17Similarly, Fracassi concludes that social network is used for exchanging information
about corporate ﬁnance policies.
18Although the high level of competition in the mutual fund industry would predict
that managers are motivated exclusively by self-interest.
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tual fund managers may have decision-making processes which are not so
diﬀerent from those of individual investors. A further possibility is that
networks create value in other ways.19 In Cohen et al. (2008) investment
positions have higher returns when social connections between mutual fund
managers and board members are present. In Bertrand et al. (2005), Faccio
(2006), and Faccio et al. (2006) ﬁrms extract beneﬁts through political con-
nections. However, I cannot exclude other mechanisms my ﬁndings suggest
that social network have a positive value in ﬁnancial markets and encourage
further works which could explore non-standard data sources, such as on-line
community information or experimental evidence.
6. Conclusion
The present work suggests an alternative view of the mutual fund industry.
Managers are linked between each other using educational information. This
social network exhibits small world characteristics, such topology, found in
many other applications, has important impact on social interactions and,
lastly, on diﬀusion of information.
Consistent with the network structure, my results suggest that social con-
nections have a positive impact on fund performance and a central position
in the social network guarantees some information gains.
To conclude, this paper highlights the importance of social network in ﬁnan-
cial markets in inﬂuencing investment decisions and performance. This result
constitutes interesting avenues of potential further research both in ﬁnance
and economics. Additional data or laboratory experiments would provide
cleanest evidence about the role of social interaction in (highly) competitive
settings.
19Otherwise, managers’ educational backgrounds may reﬂect commonalities in ethics
and culture which may impact the perceptions of risk and, ultimately, the portfolio per-
formance.
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Figure 1: Fund managers social network (year 2001). The network shows connec-
tions between fund managers based on educational information. The ﬁgure has been drawn
using the Pajek software for large social networks (Kamada-Kawai energy algorithm).
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Table 1: Summary statistics of mutual funds and managers. The table shows the
average values of mutual fund and managers characteristics. The values shown in brackets
are standard deviations. Column 5 gives the diﬀerence between column 3 (subsample of
funds with connected managers) and column 4 (subsample of funds with managers without
any link). Statistical signiﬁcance, based on a two-sided t-test, at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels is denoted by *, **, ***.
All Network=1 Network=0 Diﬀerence
FUNDS
Assets (in million) 1997 2293 1153 1239***
[7420] [4948] [8016]
Fund Age 13.51 13.84 12.46 1.37***
[14.47] [14.03] [14.60]
Expenses (in %) 1.25 1.24 1.28 -0.05**
[0.57] [0.58] [0.53]
Turnover (in %) 88.24 88.13 88.57 0.44
[1.00] [0.98] [1.06]
MANAGERS
AGE 46.23 46.31 45.92 0.38
[9.47] [9.47] [9.47]
MISSINGAGE 0.67 0.70 0.56 0.12***
[0.47] [0.46] [0.49]
Tenure 5.27 5.37 4.96 0.41**
[5.00] [5.16] [4.44]
SAT 1252 1283 1155 128***
[155] [146] [145]
MBA 0.63 0.72 0.34 0.37***
[0.48] [0.44] [0.47]
Phd 0.03 0.03 0.0 0.00
[0.19] [0.19] [0.18]
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Table 2: Summary statistics: network and centrality measures. Part A reports
average values across times of number of nodes (N), total number of links (D), network
density (δ), size of giant strong connected component, average path length (L) and cluster-
ing coeﬃcient (C) for the managers networks. Lrandom and Crandom are respectively the
average path length and the cluster coeﬃcient for random networks the same number of
nodes and links of the observed network. Part B shows the summary statistics for degree
and closeness. Values are averaged across managers and times.
A. Network measures
Average
N 301
D 1,496
δ 0.033
L 3.88
Lrandom 2.73
C 0.824
Crandom 0.035
B. Centrality measures
Degree Closeness
Mean 9 0.157
St.dev. 10 0.091
Min 1 0.005
Max 48 0.327
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Table 5: Performance and Network. Managers are connected if they attended the
same institution and they gained the same degree. In Part A I divide the sample into
two portfolios one for managers within a network (NET=1) and one for managers without
any connections (NET=0) and I calculate the equally weighted average. Part B shows
the results of the second stage of my methodology. The intercept, all controls (fund and
manager characteristics), year and style ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions but
their coeﬃcients are not shown. Standard errors (cluster at manager level) are shown in
parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, ***
respectively.
A. Performance-Portfolio Analysis
Gross Abn αi,tMKT
Network=1 0.0760 -0.0067 -0.0010
Network=0 0.0926 0.0005 -0.0004
Diﬀerence -0.0166*** -0.0073** -0.0005*
B. Regression (eq. 6)
Gross Abn αi,tMKT αi,t3F αi,t4F αi,tTM αi,tCond
NET 0.0032 0.0020 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
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